Afghanistan

The Hierarchy:The Ethnic Question in Afghanistan

Over the past couple of years, news about Afghanistan has dwindled to the usual car bomb or Opium problems. It seems as though the main issues that split Afghanistan to the point of revolution have not been addressed. Ethnicity and clan alignment was a major part of Afghan society back in the time of the Zhair Shah, and seems to continue to divide its people into factional and warlord-like allegiances. Case in point the more over riding conflict between the “Farsiwan” and the Pushtuns.

          Afghanistan has two major languages Pushto and Farsi. Farsi can be traced back to the Persian Empire and its roots run all the way to the second and first Aryan migration. It is not a Semitic language (Arabic, Aramaic and Hebrew are Semitic languages) and can be most closely compared to German, and French surprisingly. The “pure” Farsi speakers are usually the Tajiks who are related to both the Iranians and the Tajikistanis in Tajikistan. They are of more European stock and have mediterranian features, so one could concluced that in the greater scheme of things, they are most likely related to the Europeans of non-Anglo-Saxon stock and more over of “Aryan” (used in context of the tribe, not the “war” term) descent. And even more so, the Qizelbash, who are of purely Persian and Turkic descent, are more closely related to the Persians mercenaries called on by Nader Shah of Afshar, in his India campaigns in 1738. The Farsiwan usually are found living in the northern half and near Kabul in the pre-Communist era. Though, the exception of the Qizelbash who lived at one point in Kandahar in the 18^th centery then relocating to Aftshar to become known as the Afshari clan of the Qizilbash. The Farsiwan, as they will be all known as collectively from now on, through out history have conducted administrative, bureaucratic, and advisory roles in the government of various kings. One Afshari recounts (name withheld for security reasons) how their grandfathers, and those before them were highly involved in the government as advisors and close confidants to kings ranging from Nadir Shah all the way to Zahir Shah. The Farsiwan made up the intellectual and professional sector of society and became the weak but growing middle class in the 1970s. The only problem was they were mostly Shia Muslims and not Pushtun who ruled all sectors of government and education in their large, incapable and ineffective numbers.

            The Pushtuns can all trace their lineage back to one man by the name of Qias, a member of the Prophet Mohammad’s close followers. They are of Arabic origin though, now showing traces of Pakistani/Hindi stock in their features. The Pushtuns are mostly found in the southern lawless regions of the Pak-Afghan boarder and also in the larger Kandahar province. Being of mostly Arabic descent, it is safe to say that most of the nomadic Bedouin tribes that one wandered may have landed in Afghanistan at one point in time to create part of the Pushtun tribes, that of the nomadic Kochi and then the second half coming from the Arab conquest of parts of Persian and Samanid Dynasty (which was the then region of Afghanistan. The Arabs conquered Heart then Kandahar leaving a new Islamic Ghaznavid Dynasty. Many Pushtuns claim to be “Saiyid” or a direct descendent to the Prophet Mohammad, which indicates further more their Arabic roots. On Islamic grounds, they are Sunni Muslims, one of the largest sects of Islam in the world.

            The Pushtun itself is a mostly rural and rugged individual who pledges undying loyalty to their clan. They follow a code called the Pushtunwali which dictates a few rather simple rules to live by. The first being that of Nanawateh or sanctuary and asylum to a surrendering opponent.  The second is Jyrga or assembly in which major decisions are often decided by a meeting of the heads of the clan often the elderly. Namus which is the protection of honor, in this case women. This is a very tricky one to describe. A women in Pushtun society is often as much a property as a goat. If she steps “out of line” and brings “shame to the family and clan” she must be killed. This can rang from harmless conversations with men, going outside without an escort, not veiling herself from a foreigner or a man in general, or the truly horrifying, being seen having fun. But on a serious note, mostly adulterers or women who are raped are killed because they are considered shamed and un-pure. Badal is another rather violent part of the Pushtunwali code. It declares revenge or the seeking of revenge against another in any way or means necessary to achieve it. This could be a simple neighborly rivalry to a more complex blood feud that spans generations. But it ends in death both ways so there is really no difference.

More modern concepts to the Pushtunwali include khachakbar or drug and arms trafficking, Taleban or terrorist insurgency, Pushtunistan or the destruction of Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to make a more chaotic nation by combining the wild tribal regions of Kandahar to Waziristan through Peshawer, and my personal favorite Sarandoy e Islami or Islamic police in which they throw journalists in prision, beat women, and complain about the Karzai government while following most steps in the Taleban section of the code.

In all seriousness, minus the rather theatrical and satirical paragraph above, the Pushtuns have excerted their influence on Afghanistan to the point that, if your not Pushtun, your not in the club. Which club do we mean? Well, that of the professional fields, higher educations, betterment of ones position in society, and gaining of government positions. The problem here is that an unequal amount of highly skilled individuals is left in a state of despair and static social status while Pushtuns are favored for higher education trips abroad (mostly in the 1965-1980s) and government positions. The Farsiwan was usually left to lower level professional jobs unless they had contacts in the government to vouch for them. Afghanistan in the 1970s was a free for all in the job market and in admissions to Kabul University. Even entrance was skewed as one individual told us that when applying to the college of engineering, they scored the highest points but quickly accepted others to go study abroad instead of him, though he was more qualified academically then those who left. Another problem became the Pushtunistan question. Yes, I know that Shah Wali Khan fellow did say Afghanistan held no claims on it but still those Pushtuns still yell “Pushtunistan Zamung!” The Durrand Line is a major dividing factor in this conflict. The Pushtuns want to keep it as it is, unrecognized so as to let more drugtrafficker, insurgences, Extremeist Mullahs, Pakistani job poachers, and Taliban into the country. As I have said before, the more they wait to recognize the line and appease the Pushtuns, the more the country will fall into turmoil. Even that Musharaf fellow said he would recognize it and draw a series of check points and board walls through the area. This problem lies in the Pushtun tribes themselves, they have this idea that the Waziristanis and “Paks” all the way to Peshawer are their brothers and want to help them. Wrong. They could careless about the Pushtuns in Afghanistan. Even the “Pakistani Taliban” (I thought it was implied…) claimed to stop all activity (Murder, rape, killing, destruction, radicalisms, etc…) on Pakistani soil and carry out their reign of terror on Afghanistan. Now the question is, why do the Pushtuns still give their lives for these “monsters” and are still so madly in love with the idea of a separate country with them that will never happen? And if it did, hypothetically, they would create another third world country poverty stricken, illiterate, and the home to probably a great deal of insurgences and terrorist activities. That is where the conflict lies between these two groups. As the Pushtuns countinue to push their cause, the country divides further and falls into deeper unrest and chaos all the while exploiting and detaching the Farsiwan from his birthright, to be free to pursue his own life and happiness.

But as reported by many from Afghanistan itself, most of this conflict lies in the many expatriated and those who fled the communists back in the 1980s. Through the use of media and other outlets they have inflated this conflict. The feeling in Afghanistan today about this issue is less surface than in abroad. Though these issues exist, most Afghans are too busy trying to make the equivalent of 50 a month and save up for a bag of rice to feed their half starved to death families; they want peace, land, and bread, not conflict. Watching this issue unfold, seeing the hatred it has sparked, makes me wonder when Afghanistan will truly be free of the chains of oppression and conflict?

 

Photograph by: Zane Edwards of Flickr.com actual photo can be found here: http://www.flickr.com/photos/zane/18504380/

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